771 Religions in the twentieth century were caught in this crossfire of negative sentiment and attack. To modernize and to become militant was to provoke state suppression, and the effort of religious leaders to stem the rising tide of intellectual materialism failed.[3] In the countryside the old folk religions - varieties of Buddhism and Taoism -- continued to wither away. Christianity made some advances, but it was always tainted by its foreignness, by the fact that its missionaries came with the backing of the Western powers which held China in thrall.

798 Communist policy towards religion is in many ways the culmination of the trends we have described. It reflects the triumph of materialist philosophy and the imposition of materialism as the intellectual orthodoxy. It is highly nationalistic and anti-foreign and thus insists that all organizations of a religious nature cease receiving support from abroad and assert their distinctive Chinese character. It carries forward through the most effective apparatus of control and coercion that China has seen, the confiscation of church property and the secularization of the clergy. The Communist Constitution provides that "Citizens of the People's Republic of China have freedom of religious belief.[4] This means, in practice, that people of various religious persuasions

2. O. Brière, "Les courants philosophiques en Chine depuis 50 ans " Bulletin de l'université de l''Aurore, No. 40, 1947, pp. 561-654.

3. O. Brière op. cit., passim.

4. Article 88 Ch. III.

798 are allowed a limited and shrinking area of belief and action by an authoritarian government which reserves the fundamental right to control all education, communication, and public and private morality. On the grounds of anti-superstition, anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism, the government and Party move steadily with only occasional tactical retreats, towards the liquidation of religion in China.

Both pre-Communist trends and Communist policies should be kept in mind as we consider religion in the East China Region.

II. BUDDHISM

779 798 This oldest of imported religions shows, in its recent development, some of the trends just noted. Despite the efforts of the noted abbot T'ai-hsü (1889-1946), Buddhism never competed successfully for the allegiance of the intellectuals. The effort to transform it into a modern religion, by updating both its doctrine and its social program failed, although for a time it seemed to show signs of an increasing vitality. Under warlord and nationalist governments its personnel and establishments suffered severe attrition. Its establishments were taxed, its temples were converted to secular use by warlords, Kuomintang officials, and the local gentry. Much Buddhist property was confiscated, and tenants on Buddhist land refused to pay their rent. Monks and nuns were driven from their temples in the cities where up to 80 per cent of the Buddhist

779 establishments were converted into schools,
798 barracks, and police stations.[5]

The Japanese attempt to use Buddhism as an ideology to bind together their puppet regimes in China and Southeast Asia generated widespread anti-Buddhist sentiment through Free and Occupied China.

779 The older clergy of monks and nuns was accused of being corrupt and parasitic by modern Buddhists, but efforts at sweeping fundamental reform failed; the motivation for becoming a member of such a clergy remained largely negative.[6]

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5. Cf., Wing-tsit Chan, Religious Trends in Modern China, New York, 1953, pp. 55-56. This summary is from Ta-hsing, "Fifteen Years of Religious Catastrophes in Retrospect," Hai-ch'ao-yin magazine, Vol. XVI, No. 1, Jan. 1935.

6. Chan, Religious Trends, pp. 81-82, citing Reichelt, Truth and Tradition in Chinese Buddhism, pp. 231-34, lists reasons given by Chinese nuns for entering holy orders. Unhappy marriages account for a great number, and 60 to 70 per cent made choice because no other solution presented itself. Other reasons for entering holy orders include: genuine, deep faith; presented to church by parents because of devotion, sickness, lack of support, or an astrologer's advice; sense of helplessness after husband's death; poverty, family troubles or other disappointments; influence of sisters, et al, who had become nuns; and servants seeking escape from the cruelty of their mistresses.

797 identification of the Church with the Nationalist Government boded ill for the Church when the government declined in power. As the Communist
798 power increased, the persecution of the Church begun in Communist areas in 1937, was a grim warning of what might be in store for Chinese Catholicism as a whole.[61] Catholic Action, the association of enthusiastic laymen for the advancement of the Faith, had been growing in all parts of the country from 1928 onward; there were two-hundred groups and thirty youth groups as early as 1930.[62] In 1948 the Papal Nuncio ordered the formation of the Legion of Mary, a more militant, zealous, and disciplined organization of Catholic laymen, which in many areas absorbed the Catholic Action groups. The new organization was set up by an American priest and it had the Chinese name of Sheng-mu chün, Army, or Legion, of Mary. Many experienced Catholic missionaries were doubtful if any strong Chinese government would tolerate this type of militant organization. The group has proved of major propaganda value to the Communists and an object of their most ruthless measures of suppression.[63]

Communist policies and propaganda have made the most of all the vulnerabilities of the Chinese Catholic Church. Its foreign "imperialist" and Kuomintang connections were played up, and

62. Monsterleet, p. 148.

63. Cf. Hsü, Hsin Chung-kuo ti tsung-chiao ko-hsin yün-tung [The Movement for Religious Reformation in New China], Shanghai, 1951, pp. 9-13. Hereafter cited as Hsü.

798 nationalistic feelings against it were aroused. Its role as property owner -- "foreign capitalist-imperialist oppression" -- was dramatized during the land reform period, and local ignorance and hatred turned against it.[64] Old and long discredited accusations were made against Catholic charitable organizations: the Sacred Heart Home for Children in Nanking was labeled a "little Buchenwald" and the sisters were accused of torturing, neglecting, and selling Chinese children.[65] The war in Korea provided the occasion for an increasing number of accusations of espionage against the Catholic clergy.

Communist government measures have been many, but the main steps resemble those taken against other religious groups. The 1950 campaign for "triple independence" or "triple autonomy" involved freedom from foreign administration, financing, and evangelistic policy control. This was given emotional significance by the warfare in Korea and by the Communists' well-managed propaganda campaigns against imperialism and espionage.[66]

In 1951 the campaign against the Church was accelerated. All Catholic schools and universities and many hospitals and churchs were confiscated.

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64. Cf. the dramatic eyewitness account of F. Legrand, Le Communisme arrive au village Chinois, Peking, 1947. This observation was made before the nationwide land reform campaign.

65. Cf. Walker, China Under Communism, p. 190. Such accusations recall the stories circulated by the gentry which touched off the Tientsin massacre of Chinese Catholics and foreigners in 1870.

66. Monsterleet, pp. 25-29.

798 Priests were "tried" and imprisoned and the Papal Nuncio was expelled from China.[67]

The next step in the campaign against Catholicism resembled the policy followed in Russia and in the East European satellites. This was the foundation by the Communists of a "national church" whose guiding spirits were a small minority of disaffected clergy and laymen. This group was constituted as the "Committee of the Reform Church." It was not subject to episcopal or pontifical directives. The group was to decide what was to be taught, who could say mass or give the sacraments; and it advocated "progressive," i.e., orthodox Communist teaching. Under its sponsorship certain "model parishes" were set up with "progressive" priests in charge. Apparently this organization has had only limited success. The Jesuit writer Jean Monsterleet estimates that only 2 per cent of the clergy went over to the "reformed church"; nearly all openly proclaimed their faith; some died as martyrs.[68]

From October 1952 on there was less persecution of Catholics, although between January 1951 and November 1953 the number of missionaries[69] was reduced through expulsion from 3,222 to 364.

797 By far the highest concentration of Catholic clergy in the East China Region has been in Shanghai. Shanghai, like Peking, had over 200 priests; the entire province[70] of Fukien had only 177. The following table indicates the distribution of Catholic centers in East China.[71]

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67. Ibid., p. 28 68. Monsterleet, p. 29. It should be emphasized that these figures are given by a Catholic author. 69, 70, 71. [See next page]

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Province	Metropolitan Bishopric	Suffragan Diocese	Number of Catholics, 1939
Shantung	Tsinan	Chou-ts'un	268, 831
		Tzu-yang	
		Yentai(Chefoo)	
		Yang-ku	
		Lin-i	
		Ho-tse	
Anhwei	Anking	Pang-pu	113, 828
		Wu-hu	
Kiangsu	Nanking	Hsü-chou	272, 623
		Hai-men	
		Shanghai	
Chekiang	Hangchow	Ningpo	103, 190
		Lin-hai(T'ai-chou)	
Fukien	Foochow	Hsia-p'u(Fu-ning)	86,730
		Amo	

798 Since Shanghai is both a major religious center and the principal center of Catholic education in East China. it may be useful to consider the impact of Communist policies on it. The

69. Mission Bulletin, April 1952, p. 323, and Jan. 1954, p. 56; cited in Walker, op. cit., p. 189.

70. Monsterleet, p. 33.

71. Monsterleet, pp. 16-17. The Catholic population figures are quoted from the Annuaire des Missions Catholiques de Chine 1939, Shanghai, 1939.

798 general course of those policies has been outlined above. The Catholic community numbered almost 50,000. The Communist campaign for the "three autonomies," launched at the end of 1950, met with strong Catholic resistance; this centered in the Central Catholic Bureau in Shanghai founded by Monsignor Riberi, the Papal Nuncio. The bureau, despite grim reprisals against its Chinese staff, circulated the Church's statement of policy against the "three autonomies" and the proposed "reformed church" separated from Rome.[72] Accusations and the "confessions" of renegade Catholics filled the popular press. In September 1951, all Catholic primary schools in Shanghai (and in the rest of the country, 4,000 in all) were closed, and the University of Aurora, seminaries, and hospitals were taken over by the state. The state then expelled the Papal Nuncio, arrested the priests of the Catholic Bureau, and took harsh sanctions against the Shanghai membership of the Legion of Mary.[73] Reports indicate, however, that the number who left the Church was few. Father Bede Chang, a noted Catholic leader, was tortured to death when he resisted pressure to head a "reformed church." But the requiem mass in his honor on November 13, 1951, was attended by more than 3,000 persons from all parts of Shanghai.[74]

In Shanghai, as elsewhere, there was a respite from persecution from the autumn of 1952 onward. Churches were well attended, and although

72. Monsterleet, pp. 16-17.
73. Monsterleet pp. 28, 113.
74. New York Times, Dec. 11, 1955, p. 32.

798 missionaries and native priests were continually harrassed, they went on with their work. A group of British residents who left Shanghai in November 1955 testified that "Church attendance...has remained large, and Roman Catholic churches, in particular are said to be jammed at all masses."[75] But the following month the Bishop of Shanghai and his "principal accomplices" were arrested and charged with "plotting a counterrevolutionary uprising." It seemed likely that another wave of persecution was rising in Shanghai and elsewhere.[76]

The Church in China obviously faces further trials. The fundamental question is how can the church resist a totalitarian state and gain converts when conversion brings political and social sanctions against them? Father Greene, who witnessed the persecution in Kwangsi, sounds a sombre note of warning. He is speaking of the cadres:

> "It was impossible for me, as I watched these well-trained youths perform their inhuman tasks, to minimize the seriousness of their convictions and the thoroughness of their methods. These convictions were deeply impressed on their minds.... The new ideas and strange thoughts are unconditionally accepted by the young, and accepted with a fanaticism which fears neither suffering, hardship nor death. I saw shy youths changed into courageous

75. New York Times, Dec. 11, 1955, p. 32.

76. New York Times, Dec. 11, 1955, U.P. dispatch, dateline London, Dec. 10; China News Analysis, Hong Kong, 105, p. 1. No details of action taken outside of Shanghai are given.

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•798 apostles; I saw the ambitious and selfish give up their goals and possessions; I saw some of my Christian youths break the bonds of family and friendship for this Cause."[77]

The basic question is whether the harassed and persecuted Church can find the means to give its own youth these qualities. If it cannot, its future throughout China will be dark indeed.

VI. PROTESTANTISM

797 In many respects the Protestant missionaries and their converts set the pattern for the modernizing movements which took place in Buddhis and Islam. Protestant religious work in the twentieth century came to be accompanied by widespread diverse, and large-scale social service, medical, and educational activities. The Protestant missionaries helped to awaken the social conscience of the Chinese, and the missions were major centers for the dissemination of general knowledge about the West. Sun Yat-sen was a devout Christian, and Christian thought left its mark on much of his work. As pioneers in medical education, in many fields of technical education, in women's education, and in many other spheres, the Protestants made striking contributions to the dissolution of the traditional order in China. But it was beyond their

77. Robert W. Greene, Calvary in China, New York, 1953, pp. 76-77.

797 The interdenominational unions which the Japanese had imposed during their occupation broke apart and sectarian rivalries sprang up again.

"The measure of self support achieved in wartime necessity collapsed before the inflowing torrent of foreign funds. Leadership which had demonstrated both courage and competence through years of crisis politely yielded to colleagues returning from the West."[82]

American financial support also drew upon the Protestants an increasing barrage of Communist and left-wing criticism as the Nationalist Government -- receiving American support -- became increasingly discredited. Protestants, because of their preponderant emphasis on the social gospel (serving God through service to society) and their less formidable unity and discipline, suffered less in Communist-occupied areas than did the Catholics. Yet the more clear-headed of the Protestants could not but dread the rise of Communist power.

798 The timetable of Communist moves against Protestants and their organizations follows approximately that for the Catholics noted above. The "national church," the "three autonomies," the

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82. Lacy, op. cit., p. 306.

confiscation of church property, church schools, and hospitals were accompanied by a steady expulsion of the missionaries. The following figures show the decrease in Protestant missionary personnel between 1935 and 1949 and the almost total elimination of missionaries since that time.[83] In 1935, there were 5,816 Protestant missionaries in China; in 1949, about 3,000; in April 1952, only 100.

It is not possible to document the proportion of Chinese Protestants who have made their peace with the Communist regime, but "modernism," the social gospel, sectarianism, and the lack of such punitive sanctions as excommunication all tend to make the Protestants less resistant to Communist force and persuasion than the Catholics. The "three autonomies" -- in support, government and propagation -- has been a stated goal of Chinese Protestantism since 1851 and the Chinese Protestant community has generally accepted this, when stated by the Communists, as a praiseworthy end.[84] A leading Chinese Protestant layman -- under what degree of pressure we do not know -- found a number of ways to come to terms with Communism: (1) as far back as the founding of Judaism, men's highest hope has been the establishment of a solidly united, ideal society; the Communists promise such a society; (2) sectarianism has created dissension, but the Chinese have a genius for compromise; therefore there is an opportunity to promote (under the Communist government) "a grand union of the churches"; (3) Christianity is a religion of world revolution, but it has been fettered and frustrated by feudal

83. The first figure is from Handbook of the Christian Movement, reproduced in Damboriena, p. 82. Other figures are from Walker op. cit. p. 19.

84. Lacy, op. cit., pp. 307-08.